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THE LIMITS OF CONGRESS'S PREEMPTION POWER
THE RESULTING PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
APPLICATION TO THE LEADING PREEMPTION CASES OF RECENT
YEARS
I. INTRODUCTION
In The Nature of Preemption' and Rethinking Constitutional
Federalism,2 published in 1994 and 1996 respectively, I thought I had
written everything I had to say about the topic of preemption. Rereading
subsequent cases and academic commentary in preparation for this
symposium, however, convinced me both that this thought was premature
and that part of what I had already said might perhaps bear, if not repeating,
reformulation.
Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. This Article is a substantially expanded version of my
presentation at the Pepperdine University School of Law Symposium on Federal Preemption of State
Tort Law, held on April 9, 2005. I would like to thank Dean Kenneth Starr for his gracious
hospitality during the symposium, fellow panelists and participants for stimulating discussion,
Courtney Lang, Pepperdine Law Review Symposium Editor, for superb organization, and Kevin
Gerson, reference librarian at the UCLA School of Law Library, for excellent research assistance.
1. Stephen Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767 (1994).
2. Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEXAS L. REV. 795 (1996).
Preemption remains a notorious doctrinal labyrinth and will, in my
view, continue to do so until its conceptual and constitutional foundations
have been given more attention. In particular, what must be more widely
appreciated are the following: (1) that preemption and supremacy are
separate and distinct concepts; (2) that although both involve the
displacement of state law, they displace different types of state law and do
so in different ways; (3) that consequently, the Supremacy Clause is largely
a red herring in preemption analysis; and (4) that the key issues are the
nature, source, and limits of Congress's power to preempt the states. In
other words, the law of preemption is not only about interpreting what
Congress has done, but also includes threshold conceptual and constitutional
issues about what it has the power to do. This neglected dimension must be
moved to center stage if preemption doctrine is to have a coherent and
principled framework.
In this Article, I will build upon my earlier work3 to explain and justify
-the four above claims and to propose such a framework. The result of my
analysis is a radical simplification of preemption law. Congress has the
power to preempt the states but can only do so expressly; there is no such
thing as implied preemption. Where Congress has not spoken directly to the
issue of preemption in the statutory text, there is no second set of principles
-implied preemption-permitting courts to infer preemption from the
nuances of congressional silence, as at present. In the final section, I
illustrate the practical workings of my recast preemption doctrine by
applying it to the leading cases of recent years.
II. PREEMPTION AND SUPREMACY
Supremacy and preemption are distinct constitutional concepts, each of
which regulates the relationship between concurrent federal and state powers
in a different way.4 Although both may be said to result in the displacement
of state law, failure to distinguish them (either at all or properly) has had
serious consequences for the law of preemption.5
Supremacy is an attribute of federal law, specifying its hierarchical
status vis-a-vis state law. It is, moreover, an attribute that automatically or
inherently attaches to all federal law by virtue of the Supremacy Clause
6
and, like other such attributes-for example, being the law of the land
3. In addition to the two articles cited supra in notes I and 2, see also Stephen Gardbaum, New
Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 483 (1997); Stephen
Gardbaum, Preemption, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1989 (Leonard W.
Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000).
4. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 770.
5. See id. at 807-15.
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which states that:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id.
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directly upon enactment without need for state implementation-is not
something that Congress can either bestow or change.7 Supremacy means
that in the case of a conflict between federal and state law, federal law
trumps or displaces the conflicting state law.
Preemption, by contrast, is a power of Congress rather than an automatic
characteristic of federal law. Like all powers of Congress, it is discretionary
and so may or may not be exercised.8 Moreover, Congress's power of
preemption, when exercised to the full, has a far more radical impact on state
law than the automatic characteristic of federal supremacy. 9 This is so for
two reasons. First, by exercising its power of preemption, Congress can
displace state law even where the latter is not in conflict with federal law. 10
For example, Congress may choose to preempt state cigarette labeling
requirements that are identical to federal ones. Ex hypothesi, such state laws
are not displaced by the mere supremacy of federal law.
Second, by exercising its preemption power, Congress may not only
displace particular non-conflicting state laws but redistribute general
legislative competence between itself and the states." It may convert
concurrent federal and state power over a given regulatory area into
exclusive federal power; that is, to deprive the states of their preexisting
concurrent legislative authority, in whole or in part. Thus, for example,
Congress may choose to preempt all (existing and future) state law in the
area of cigarette liability, leaving federal law as the only enforceable law in
the field. Once again, the mere supremacy of federal law by itself does no
such thing.
Accordingly, whereas supremacy means the displacement of conflicting
state law, preemption means the displacement of non-conflicting state law
and/or concurrent state authority in a given field. Preemption is not needed
to-and does not--displace state laws the contents of which conflict with
valid federal laws; they are automatically displaced by the operation of the
Supremacy Clause. Thus, although both supremacy and preemption displace
(or supercede) state law, they operate to displace different types of state law
and do so by the different mechanisms of automatic consequence and
discretionary power respectively. The general failure to recognize that there
are two different ways in which state law may be displaced, as evidenced by
7. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 773 (indicating that "[u]nlike preemption, which is a matter of
legislative will, supremacy is inherently a judicial matter.").
8. Id.
9. Id. at 771.
10. As Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes succinctly put it in response to the state's argument that
its law was not in conflict with the federal law: "When Congress has taken the particular subject-
matter in hand, coincidence of a state statute is as ineffective as opposition .... " Charleston & W.
Carolina Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597 (1915).
11. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 771 (stating that "[w]hen states lose their concurrent lawmaking
powers through preemption by Congress... [they] no longer [have] power to legislate at all in the
given area.").
generic use of the term "preemption,"" is a major cause of conceptual and
doctrinal confusion. This is most obviously (but not exclusively) the case
with the doctrinal category of "conflict preemption."13
It might be helpful here to give another concrete example of the
difference between supremacy and preemption, one based on last term's
controversial medical marijuana case. 4  Once the Court had upheld
Congress's regulation of marijuana for personal use as a valid exercise of its
commerce clause power,15 the case was then governed by the principle of
federal supremacy automatically attaching to the federal Controlled
Substances Act (hereinafter "CSA"). 16 To the extent, and only to the extent,
that the rules of law contained in California's Compassionate Use Act of
1996 conflict with the rules of law contained in the CSA, the former are
displaced by the latter. Specifically, the state rules permitting doctors to
prescribe marijuana in circumstances forbidden by the CSA are displaced
and unenforceable because of federal supremacy. This automatic
characteristic of federal law has no application at all to parts of the state law
not in conflict with the CSA, and California retains full concurrent
legislative authority to amend its rules and requirements in any way it
chooses that avoids the conflict. In the course of enacting the CSA,
Congress did not choose to exercise its power of preemption, which it would
have needed (or still needs) to do to alter these two latter propositions: that
is, to displace either particular non-conflicting state rules or general state
authority on the subject altogether. In other words, notwithstanding the
displacement of state law that has taken place, Gonzales v. Raich is a case
involving supremacy and not preemption.
Finally, the difference between preemption and supremacy as
mechanisms for displacing state law is reflected in how courts assess their
application. When the issue of supremacy comes into play, a court must
answer two questions: first, what do the federal and state laws each say; and
second, how do they fit together? To answer this second question, the court
must look at and compare the contents of both the federal law and the state
law to see if their terms conflict with each other. This task obviously cannot
be done by considering only the federal law. This point is, of course, true of
all supremacy/conflict issues, of which federal-state conflicts are one
instance. A second instance is the supremacy of the Constitution over a
conflicting federal statute, established in Marbury v. Madison,17 which
12. For a recent, but entirely unexceptional, example of this conflation in the academic literature,
see Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 225 n.3 (2000) (stating that "[i]n this Article, I
use the term 'preemption' to refer to the displacement of state law by federal statutes (or by courts
seeking to fill gaps in federal statutes)."); see also id. at 251 (stating that "[t]he doctrine of
preemption.. .[is] the displacement of state law by federal law .....
13. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 808-10.
14. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
15. Id. at 2219.
16. Id. at 2212. This may change if and when the relevant provisions of the CSA are challenged
as violating a constitutional right to palliative care under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. See generally Raich, 125 S. Ct, at 2200 (noting that the respondent raised a Due Process
claim which, because it was not reached by the lower court, the Court did not address).
17. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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requires (as famously and rhetorically described by Marshall) putting both
texts alongside each other and comparing their contents. 18 This is not true of
preemption, however. To take the clearest and most paradigmatic case, the
only law relevant to an adjudicating court when Congress enacts an express
preemption provision is the federal law, and the only question it has to
answer is the interpretive one of what Congress has said on the extent to
which it has exercised its power. There is no second, comparative question
involving the content of state law. 19 This fact is itself further illustration of
the point that preemption, unlike supremacy, is not centrally about conflicts
between federal and state laws.
III. THE OVERSTATED ROLE OF THE SUPREMACY CLAUSE IN PREEMPTION
ANALYSIS
In my previous work on this subject, I have tried to hack a path out of
the preemption thickets by showing that the role of the Supremacy Clause-
which embodies the principle of supremacy-is far less central to the issue
of preemption than courts and commentators universally assume or claim.2°
This is so for two connected reasons. First, as I have just explained, the
concept of preemption (unlike the concept of supremacy) is not essentially
about conflicts between federal and state laws, but about displacing non-
conflicting state laws and/or concurrent state authority. Second, contrary to
18. A third supremacy/conflict issue is whether a later federal statute conflicts with, and thereby
impliedly repeals, an earlier one. On the history of this issue and the original understanding of the
legislative use of "notwithstanding" or "non obstante" provisions in this context see Nelson, supra
note 12, at 235-44.
19. Of course, once a court has completed its preemption analysis, state law may be relevant to
the outcome of the case to the extent it is not preempted. But, unlike in the case of supremacy, state
law is not relevant to the issue of preemption itself. Two representative cases illustrating this
difference in application are Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1 (1824), one of the Supreme
Court's earliest supremacy cases, and Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996), a modem
express preemption case. In Gibbons, having first found Congress's 1793 statute a valid exercise of
its Commerce Clause power, Chief Justice Marshall then turned to the second, comparative question:
the Court will enter upon the inquiry, whether the laws of New-York, as expounded by
the highest tribunal of that State, have, in their application to this case, come into
collision with an act of Congress, and deprived a citizen of a right to which that act
entitles him. Should this collision exist ... the acts of New-York must yield to the laws
of Congress ....
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210.
In Medtronic, by contrast, the Court gave no consideration whatsoever to the content of any
state law. The preemption issue posed in the case-whether and to what extent state common law
claims were preempted by the express preemption provision of Congress's Medical Device
Amendments of 1976-was answered exclusively by interpreting that provision. Medtronic, 518
U.S. at 502-03.
20. Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 769-773.
the entrenched orthodoxy,2" Congress's power of preemption does not
derive from the Supremacy Clause.
22
I believe I have made some headway with this second reason, but little
with the first. 23 Even here, however, those accepting my argument about the
constitutional source of preemption have not proceeded to engage the issue
or its significance, but have moved on quickly, back into the doctrine, by
either simply assuming congressional power to preempt or stipulating an
alternative source.24 As a result, the conventional view that preemption is
all about conflict, and hence about the Supremacy Clause, retains its
hegemony.25 So although in recent years certain academic commentators
21. For examples of the orthodoxy, see Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88,
108 (1992) (stating that "[blut under the Supremacy Clause, from which our pre-emption doctrine is
derived .. "); Kathleen M. Sullivan & Gerald Gunther, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 324 (15th ed. 2004)
(noting that "[w]hen Congress exercises a granted power, the federal law may supersede the state
law and preempt state authority, because of the operation of the Supremacy Clause of Art. VI.").
22. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 773-77.
23. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 12, at 234 n.32. Professor Nelson explains that:
Stephen Gardbaum has criticized the Court and commentators for tracing preemption to
the Supremacy Clause. As Professor Gardbaum properly observes, the Clause does not
expand the areas that Congress may legitimately regulate; in order to have any
preemptive effect, federal statutes must be authorized... by something else in the
Constitution.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO.
L.J. 2085, 2088 (2000) (explaining that "it is critically important to note the Supremacy Clause itself
does not authorize Congress to preempt state laws.").
24. Immediately following the sentence quoted in the previous footnote, Professor Nelson
continues as follows: "Still assuming that a particular preemption clause is within Congress's power
to enact, the Supremacy Clause is the reason that the clause has its intended effect; it is the
Supremacy Clause that requires courts to ignore whatever state laws a valid preemption clause
covers." See Nelson, supra note 12, at 234 n.32 (emphasis added). (As I will explain in infra note
31 and accompanying text, although the Supremacy Clause operates as a reason that state law is
displaced, in the case of preemption it is not the primary or most important reason-unlike in the
case of supremacy). Throughout his article, Professor Nelson avoids the issue of the source of
Congress's power of preemption by repeating this (or a similar conditional) construction. So, for
example, he states that "[i]f Congress has the constitutional power to occupy a particular field, a
federal statute may do so either expressly or by implication." Id. at 263. And elsewhere, he writes
that, "[t]he simple fact is that if a federal statute establishes a rule, and if the Constitution grants
Congress the power to establish that rule, then the rule preempts whatever state law it contradicts."
Id. at 264 (emphasis added).
The only affirmative discussion of source in Professor Dinh's article contains no explanation
or justification of the power, but only what "must" be the case if the power exists:
The power to preempt state law, if one exists, must be found elsewhere in the
Constitution [than the Supremacy Clause], most logically in the affirmative grants of
power to Congress under Article I, Section 8. Therefore, should Congress legislate
pursuant to its power, say, to regulate interstate commerce and further include a provision
expressly preempting certain state laws, the authority for the preemption provision must
come from either the Commerce Clause alone or perhaps the Commerce Clause with a
helping hand from the Necessary and Proper Clause .... The power to preempt,
therefore, is necessarily pendant on some enumerated power to regulate under Article I,
Section 8.
See Dinh, supra note 23, at 2090-91.
25. Professor Nelson's entire article is expressly premised on the proposition that proper
historical and textual understanding of the Supremacy Clause is the key to preemption analysis.
More specifically, he states that "[r]ecognizing that preemption is all about contradiction [as we
should] would tend to rein in the potential breadth of 'implied' preemption." Nelson, supra note 12,
at 304 (emphasis added). In the same vein, he states that "once we recognize that all preemption
cases are about contradiction between state and federal law, we should begin to question the
[Vol. 33: 39, 2005] Congress's Power to Preempt the States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
have proposed lopping a head or two off the hydra-like monster of
preemption doctrine,26 it is this continuing hegemony that protects its heart.
Surgery at a more foundational level is required if the monster is ever to be
truly tamed. Accordingly, let me here attempt to reformulate my alternative
paradigm in a way that will perhaps be more persuasive.
It is undoubtedly true that if Congress exercises its power of
preemption, then state laws in conflict with this exercise are trumped under
the Supremacy Clause. So, for example, if Congress chooses to enact a law
that deprives the states of all regulatory authority in the field of automobile
safety standards, then any particular state automobile standard relied on by a
plaintiff in a lawsuit will be in conflict with the federal law and trumped by
the automatic operation of the Supremacy Clause.27 It is true but relatively
trivial from the perspective of understanding and analyzing Congress's
power of preemption. For this very same fact is true of any congressional
power and not only preemption: a state law in conflict with a valid exercise
of an enumerated power is trumped because of the supremacy automatically
attaching to the federal law. Thus, as we have seen, in exercising its power
to regulate interstate commerce in the medical marijuana case---even
without also exercising its preemption power-the Supremacy Clause
operates to trump the conflicting state law. But no one thinks, nor would
think based on this example, that the Supremacy Clause plays an essential
and critical role in understanding the nature, scope, and limits of Congress's
Commerce Clause power. Rather, supremacy is simply a background
principle that automatically operates and attaches to the enactment of any
federal law. In their various and ingenious attempts to establish the scope of
Congress's commerce power over the years, courts and commentators have
spent no time on the background principle of supremacy, and rightly so.
usefulness of dividing them into the separate analytical categories of 'express' preemption, 'field'
preemption, and 'conflict' preemption". Id. at 262 (emphasis added); see also Dinh, supra note 23,
at 2091 n.36:
Such a [preemption] provision has preemptive effect only to the extent that the
Supremacy Clause gives it precedence over conflicting state laws - in other words, state
laws that seek to be valid within the scope prescribed by the preemption provision.
Express preemption, therefore, is only a special case of true conflict preemption - that is,
a special case of supremacy.
(emphasis added).
26. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 12, at 265-76, 290-98 (rejecting (1) the doctrine of obstacle
preemption as contrary to the historical understanding of the analogous issue of when one statute
impliedly repeals another, and (2) the presumption against preemption as inconsistent with the
historical understanding of the non obstante provision in the Supremacy Clause); Dinh, supra note
23, at 2088 (challenging the modem presumption against preemption as inconsistent with the
constitutional structure of federalism).
27. This is an example of a second-order or "jurisdictional conflict"-a conflict between
Congress's enactment that states may not regulate a given area and the state law regulating that same
area-as distinct from a first-order or "substantive conflict" between federal and state laws. See 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1177 (3d ed. 2000); see also Gardbaum,
supra note 1, at 773-77.
28. See Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005).
Precisely the same should be true of Congress's power of preemption. To
focus on the relatively trivial and commonplace effect of the exercise of this
power (that all state laws in conflict with its exercise will be trumped under
the Supremacy Clause) and to ignore or bypass the power itself, as the
orthodox position continues to do, is as myopic in the case of preemption as
it would clearly be seen to be with any of Congress's other powers.
Indeed, it is more myopic because what distinguishes the power of
preemption from Congress's other enumerated powers is precisely that
preemption is the power to displace (non-conflicting) state laws and
concurrent state authority. In the above automobile example, it is the
exercise of the preemption power itself that is primarily and importantly
responsible for displacing state law, and not the resulting conflict between
that exercise and state law. Whatever technical "bit part" the Supremacy
Clause plays, it is preemption that is the star, doing the real work of
displacing. 29 Accordingly, just as with Congress's other powers, it is the
source, scope, and limits of Congress's power of preemption that should
engage us as a threshold matter. In short, the foundational issues about
preemption (as distinct from supremacy) have as little to do with the
Supremacy Clause and its operation as does Congress's commerce power or
taxing powers.
To summarize: supremacy is all about conflict.3 ° Conflict between
federal and state laws is the only reason that state laws are displaced under
the principle of supremacy. By contrast, preemption is not all about conflict
between federal and state laws, but is primarily about a congressional power
and its exercise. It is the exercise of this power that is the major reason state
law is displaced-because Congress has said so-and not the existence of
the resulting conflict.31 Accordingly, what is central to preemption analysis
and doctrine is not conflict, not the Supremacy Clause, but the nature,
source, and limits of Congress's power of preemption.
IV. THE OPTIONAL NATURE OF CONGRESS'S PREEMPTION POWER
Before embarking on the necessary but missing analysis of Congress's
power of preemption, it is important to frame it properly by understanding
that there is nothing inevitable, either in theory or in practice, about granting
a power of preemption to the central government in a federal system. There
are at least three other possibilities. The first is to allocate legislative powers
29. Imagine for a moment that there were no Supremacy Clause in the Constitution. With
respect to Congress's other enumerated powers, a court would have no textual direction whatsoever
on how to resolve a conflict between federal and state laws; there would simply be a substantive
federal rule and a substantive state rule, as in Raich (the medical marijuana case). But given
Congress's power of preemption, and assuming a valid exercise thereof, a court would have clear
direction from the very nature of this enumerated power that displacement of state law was expected
and intended.
30. See discussion supra Part 11.
31. Here, I am explaining my disagreement with Professor Nelson's position that "preemption is
all about contradiction," and the sense in which I disagree with him that in preemption cases, "the
Supremacy Clause is the reason" why state law is displaced. See supra note 24.
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between federal and state governments on an exclusive basis. That is, those
powers granted to the state governments are granted to them exclusively, as
are those granted to the federal government. This avoids a power of
preemption because preemption regulates and redistributes concurrent
federal and state powers only, and ex hypothesi, there are none.32 The U.S.
Supreme Court flirted with this structure during the period of so-called "dual
federalism" in the nineteenth century but definitively abandoned it during
the New Deal.33 Within modem federal systems, Canada comes closest to
this model in that its constitution lists fifteen "Classes of Subjects" in which
the provincial legislatures have exclusive power to enact legislation and
thirty areas in which the federal Parliament has exclusive legislative
power.34 There are, however, in addition, three express areas of concurrent
federal and provincial power.35
The second alternative to a central power of preemption within a federal
system is to leave concurrent federal and state powers to be regulated only
by the principle of supremacy. That is, state law within an area of
concurrent power is displaced if and only if it conflicts with substantive
provisions of federal law. In this scenario, particular non-conflicting state
laws are immune from federal displacement and states always retain general
concurrent legislative authority. As a result, they can choose to amend their
laws to avoid any conflicts. As I have argued elsewhere, this structure of
federalism was generally in place in the United States (apart, that is, from
the periods of flirtation with "dual federalism") from 1789 until
approximately 1912.36
The third and final alternative to a federal legislative power of
preemption is a system in which concurrent state powers automatically
terminate within a given area if and when the federal legislature exercises its
concurrent power in that same area. This alternative, in other words,
converts preemption from a discretionary power of the federal entity into an
automatic characteristic of federal law, much as I have explained that
32. It similarly avoids the principle of supremacy because, absent concurrent powers, there
cannot be a conflict between otherwise valid federal and state laws.
33. The "flirtation" with dual federalism revolved primarily around the positive and negative
aspects of the Commerce Clause. Thus, under its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court sometimes suggested that Congress's power over interstate commerce was
exclusive, while under its Commerce Clause jurisprudence the Court suggested that state power over
intrastate commerce was exclusive. This ended during the New Deal, when federal and state power
over both interstate and intrastate commerce was in effect recognized as concurrent. See Gardbaum,
New Deal Constitutionalism and the Unshackling of the States, supra note 3, at 506-532; see also
Sally Fairfax, Old Recipes for New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 952 (1982) (stating that "[d]ual
federalism 'passed' during the period of the Depression and World War II" mainly because of the
New Deal policies).
34. CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867,30 & 31 Vict. Ch. 3, (U.K.) §§ 91-92.
35. These areas are pensions, agriculture, and immigration. See id. §§ 94A, 95.
36. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 787-800.
supremacy is in the U.S. system.37 Rather than granting the states fully
concurrent powers subject to the principle of supremacy and the power of
preemption, therefore, this alternative grants them "first mover" authority
subject to the automatic latent exclusivity of federal law. Here, preemption
is an automatic characteristic and consequence of federal action, and not a
discretionary one at the instance of the federal legislature. Again, I have
argued elsewhere that this alternative system was in place in the United
States between approximately 1912 and 1933, when it was replaced by the
current structure of concurrency, supremacy, and the discretionary
congressional power of preemption.38 Comparatively, Article 72(1) of the
Basic Law enshrines this mechanism as the method for regulating concurrent
powers in the Federal Republic of Germany.39
V. THE SOURCE OF CONGRESS'S PREEMPTION POWER
Within the reigning paradigm that I am challenging, the only issue to be
determined is whether, and to what extent, Congress has exercised its
preemption power-and the content of preemption law is the set of
interpretive rules that are used to determine this issue. I have argued above
that this is to overlook the important conceptual and constitutional
dimension of preemption, which concerns the nature, source and limits of
this power. Moreover, a proper understanding of these issues is the
necessary foundation for a coherent preemption doctrine to be constructed.
In Parts II to IV above, I have provided my explanation of the nature of
Congress's power of preemption, so let me now turn in this section to the
source of this power and in the next, to its limits.
Like all powers of Congress, the power of preemption must be an
enumerated one. As I have explained in full elsewhere and mentioned
briefly above, the power of preemption does not and cannot derive from the
Supremacy Clause.4 °  In a nutshell, in terms of the two types of
displacement of state law, the Supremacy Clause is the source only of the
(lesser) principle of supremacy and not the (greater) power of preemption.
Indeed, the Supremacy Clause does not purport to grant any powers but
rather supplies the rule for resolving conflicts resulting from exercise of
concurrent federal powers granted elsewhere in the Constitution. Put
another way, the Supremacy Clause resolves conflicts between valid federal
and state laws but it does not determine whether a federal law is valid - a
federal law preempting the states or any other. The answer to this issue,
37. This alternative does not, of course, change the meaning of preemption, which is that non-
conflicting state laws and/or general concurrent state authority are displaced by federal law. It
simply changes the mechanism for bringing this displacement into effect, from a discretionary power
of the legislature to an automatic attribute of federal law.
38. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 801-08.
39. Article 72(1) states: "[o]n matters within the concurrent legislative power [of the Federation],
the Lander [(States)] shall have power to legislate so long as and to the extent that the Federation has
not exercised its ... [right to legislate]." Grundgestz ffir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG]
[German Basic Law] May 23, 1949.
40. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 773-77.
[Vol. 33: 39, 2005] Congress's Power to Preempt the States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
with preemption as with any of Congress's powers, depends on the source,
scope and limits of the relevant power. In short, if Congress has the power
of preemption, its source is not the Supremacy Clause.
Once we turn to Congress's enumerated powers listed in Article I or
elsewhere in the Constitution, there is obviously no express power of
preemption. Moreover, all of Congress's other powers are entirely workable
and plausible without a power of preemption: if the valid exercise of any
results in a conflict with state laws, the latter are displaced because of the
supremacy that inherently attaches to the former. 4' As we have seen in the
medical marijuana example, this is as true of Congress's Commerce Clause
power as of any other: by enacting the CSA to regulate interstate commerce
in dangerous drugs, any and all state laws-such as California's
Compassionate Use Act-in conflict with its terms are displaced because of
the CSA's inherent supremacy. Why then might preemption be needed at
all? Why, when it is regulating interstate commerce, for example, might
Congress want in addition to displace non-conflicting state laws and/or
continuing concurrent state authority (which are, of course, not covered by
the principle of supremacy)?
The answer to this question suggests the constitutional justification and
source of the power. Sometimes, for the effective regulation of interstate
commerce in a particular good or class of goods (or for the effective exercise
of any of its enumerated powers), Congress will judge it necessary to have a
single, uniform set of rules rather than multiple sets of actually or potentially
non-conflicting state rules. The fact that in some situations preemption (and
not merely supremacy) may be necessary as a means for the effective
exercise of one of Congress's enumerated ends exactly states the canonic
understanding and purpose of the Necessary and Proper Clause.42 For this
enumerated power of Congress is indeed the proper and best source of
Congress's power of preemption.
Why isn't the Commerce Clause itself the source of Congress's power
of preemption? Why isn't preemption just an instance of regulating
interstate commerce, simply a form that such regulation may take? I have
answered this at length elsewhere,43 but for the present, let me add a few
things to what I have previously said. It is not that it is incoherent or
impossible to think of the preemption power in this way, just as it is not
incoherent or implausible to think that, say, banning the possession of guns
41. See discussion supra Part IV (explaining the second alternative to a federal power of
preemption).
42. The Necessary and Proper Clause states: "[The Congress shall have Power] [t]o make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
43. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 777-81; Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 803-07.
near schools is an instance of regulating interstate commerce. 44 In the realm
of constitutional justification, the task is to determine the best or most
plausible argument in light of the factors that typically determine the
correctness of propositions of constitutional law. In the context of
McCulloch v. Maryland,45 it could no doubt have been similarly argued that
establishing a Bank of the United States was a regulation of interstate
commerce rather than a means deemed necessary for such regulation. And
yet that argument was not accepted, nor even obviously made, in McCulloch
itself and the case remains as the paradigmatic instance of the use by
Congress of its Necessary and Proper power.
Lest it be thought that this point about McCulloch rests on an
anachronistically limited view of the commerce power, or of interpreting
Congress's enumerated powers more generally, it is important to note that
the very same paradigm was used by the Court to expand this precise power
during the New Deal. As the Court itself made crystal clear at the time (and
as Justices O'Connor and Scalia together with a few academic commentators
have more recently observed),46 the expansion of Congress's commerce
power was premised not on the Commerce Clause itself but on the
McCulloch interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.47 The New
Deal Court explicitly held that regulating local, intrastate conduct is not
itself a regulation of interstate commerce but is sometimes judged by
Congress to be a necessary means for the effective regulation of what is
interstate commerce.48 Thus, in Wickard v. Filburn,49 growing wheat for
home consumption was not interstate commerce, nor even commerce of any
sort. Rather, its aggregate effect of reducing demand was such that
regulation became, in Congress's judgment, necessary for the effective
44. I am here, of course, referring to United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), in which the
Court held that this ban did not amount to a regulation of interstate commerce.
45. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
46. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 584-85 (1985) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that it is through the Necessary and Proper Clause that "an intrastate activity
'affecting' interstate commerce can be reached through the commerce power"); see also Gonzales v.
Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2216 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that "Congress's regulatory
authority over intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the Necessary and
Proper Clause."). Among academic commentators, see DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL
FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 31 (2d ed. 1987); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS
POLITICAL STRUCTURE 52-53 (1995); see also Gardbaum, supra note 2, at 807-11.
47. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941). The Court explains in Darby that
The power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of
commerce among the states. It extends to those activities intrastate which so affect
interstate commerce ... as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the
attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the granted power of Congress to regulate
interstate commerce.
Id. (citing McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421); see also United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
110, 119 (1942) (quoting the same passage from McCulloch and citing Darby); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (quoting Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S.
at 119).
48. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 124-25.
49. Id. at 127-28.
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regulation of the interstate market for wheat.50  If direct congressional
regulation of intrastate commerce is properly understood not as an exercise
of the Commerce Clause power but of the Necessary and Proper Clause,
then so too should the more indirect route of ending state power to regulate
intrastate commerce; that is, preemption.
Finally, let me briefly inject a comparative dimension into the argument.
Recall two other possibilities for the allocation of legislative powers in a
federal system from the previous section: (1) concurrency plus supremacy
alone, with no power of preemption, and (2) concurrency and automatic
preemption upon the exercise of federal power. Federal constitutions
everywhere typically grant the central government express power to regulate
interstate commerce,5' but it is an open and separate question whether and
how they also grant a power of preemption-an analytically and practically
distinct power. In Germany, for example, an express commerce power is
combined with (a) the absence of a necessary and proper clause or other
implied powers provision52 and (b) express provision for automatic
preemption. 3 These textual similarities and differences at least suggest the
plausibility of the Necessary and Proper Clause as the source of the
discretionary preemption power in the United States.
VI. THE LIMITS OF CONGRESS'S PREEMPTION POWER
Preemption is one of Congress's enumerated powers albeit, as I have
argued, a part of its enumerated implied powers under the Necessary and
Proper Clause. As an inherent and automatic feature of federal law,
supremacy operates whether Congress says so or not. By contrast, as a
discretionary power of Congress, preemption operates only if Congress says
so.54 Is there anything specific to this power that conditions how Congress
says so? Is it sufficient, for example, for Congress to exercise this power
impliedly or must it do so expressly? What other limits, if any, do either the
50. Id.
51. For example, the Canadian Constitution grants exclusive legislative power to the federal
parliament over the "Regulation of Trade and Commerce." CONSTITUTION ACT, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict.
Ch. 3, (U.K.) § 91(2). The Australian Constitution includes among the enumerated powers granted
to the federal government, "Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States."
AUSTL. CONST. § 51 (i). The German Basic Law grants concurrent power to the federal government
over "the law relating to economic affairs (mining, industry, energy, crafts, trades, commerce,
banking, stock exchanges, and private insurance)" and to "labor law." Grundgesetz flir die
Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [German Basic Law] May 23, 1949, art. 74, cl. 11-12.
52. As I will discuss in infra Part VI, the nearest thing in Germany is Article 72(2) of the
German Basic Law. However, unlike the Necessary and Proper Clause in the United States
Constitution, this is not a grant of implied powers but rather a general limit on expressly granted
concurrent powers. See discussion supra note 39 and accompanying text.
53. Grundgesetz flir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [German Basic Law] May 23, 1949,
art. 72, cl. 2.
54. See discussion supra Part II.
Necessary and Proper Clause source, or any other relevant constitutional
principles, suggest on the exercise of this power?
In what follows, I will address this issue from four perspectives. First,
how do any general limits on the Necessary and Proper Clause power apply
specifically to the case of preemption? Second, regardless of the particular
source of the preemption power (that is, even if the Necessary and Proper
Clause is not accepted as the source), are there any other similar
congressional powers that are understood to have relevant conditions on
their valid exercise? Third, are any limits on the preemption power
suggested by looking at the issue through the lens of the "political
safeguards of federalism?"55  Fourth, do comparative constitutional
materials provide any potential guidance on this issue?
My conclusion will be that all four perspectives point to precisely the
same constitutional limitation: Congress can only exercise its preemption
power expressly. As a matter of constitutional law, there should be no such
thing as implied preemption. If Congress wishes to exercise its preemption
power, it must say so by speaking directly to the issue. It is up to the courts
to determine what Congress has said, using ordinary principles of statutory
interpretation in the case of ambiguity, but not to premise an exercise of this
power on "sheer implication"56 from congressional silence, as is now the
case. Accordingly, there should be only two ways in which state law can be
displaced: (1) non-conflicting state law and/or concurrent state authority
may be displaced by express exercise of Congress's preemption power, and
(2) conflicting state law is automatically displaced by operation of federal
supremacy.
First, how do any general constitutional limits on the scope of
Congress's Necessary and Proper Clause power apply in the specific case of
preemption-which, I have argued, is an instance of this power? In
McCulloch, John Marshall famously summarized both the scope and the
limits of the power as follows: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."57 And just a few
sentences before, in justifying his more flexible definition of "necessary," he
wrote of "the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the
selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the
government." 58
As applied specifically to the power of preemption, I suggest that
Marshall's general test of the scope and limits of the Necessary and Proper
Clause has the following content. Congress has not only the "right" but also
55. See infra note 81.
56. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (using this phrase in description, not criticism, of the Court's implied
preemption doctrine: ". . .[preemption] can be achieved by sheer implication, with no express
statement of intent at all.").
57. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
58. Id. at 420.
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the duty "to exercise its best judgment"59 on whether preemption of the
states is necessary given its regulatory goals. In concrete terms, this means
that although the substance of Congress's judgment of the necessity of
preemption is not subject to judicial review, it must affirmatively address the
issue and render a good faith judgment on it. This simply cannot be done
impliedly. Moreover, this congressional judgment that there is a need to
displace non-conflicting state law and/or concurrent state authority must be
expressed in the text of the statute. Statements in legislative history may
function as aids in interpreting what Congress has said about the issue of
preemption in the text, but not as substitutes for the text in ensuring that
Congress has spoken directly to the issue.
To go back to McCulloch and the establishment of the Bank of the
United States under the Necessary and Proper Clause, clearly explicit
congressional discussion of its need had occupied many sessions.60 Would
the law have satisfied Marshall's test if there had been no congressional
discussion of the Bank as a necessary measure? Would it have satisfied
Marshall's test if the relevant statute had not expressly created the Bank but
did so only by judicial implication of congressional intent? More generally,
and Marshall's test aside, can Congress ever exercise its Necessary and
Proper Clause power impliedly? What is an implied exercise of an implied
power?
This requirement of congressional exercise of judgment, as expressed in
the statutory text, is supplemented by the last part of Marshall's test, which
is that exercises of implied powers must comport with "the spirit of the
Constitution.",61 Since federalism and the constitutional role of the states are
undoubtedly central components of this "spirit," it would, I suggest, be
violated if the states, with their continuing concurrent authority as the
Constitution's default position, were not given at least this much
consideration in the federal legislative process and product. Their
concurrent powers should not be abrogated by mere judicial implication
from congressional silence.
Accordingly, as a consequence of the preemption power's derivation
from the Necessary and Proper Clause, there should be a constitutional
requirement that Congress can only exercise this power expressly. There
must be some statutory text in which Congress specifies that it is altering the
default constitutional position of concurrency plus supremacy. In the
context of preemption, a purely implied exercise of an implied power-in
which the courts fill in the nuances of congressional silence-violates the
"spirit" of the Constitution, of which the guaranteed role of the states is a
59. Id.
60. Id. at 323.
61. Id. at 421.
central part. It also violates the duty that Congress has to exercise its best
judgment on the necessity of preemption.
Second, independent of the Necessary and Proper Clause derivation of
preemption, there is a powerful additional constitutional reason for the
proposition that this power may only be exercised expressly. That is, this
reason would still operate whatever the source of the power. The reason is
the similarity of the preemption power with two other powers of Congress to
redefine federal-state relations that, as a matter of constitutional law, can
only be exercised expressly. These two other powers are: (1) Congress's
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment,
and (2) Congress's power to authorize discriminatory state laws that would
otherwise violate the dormant Commerce Clause. Both powers have long
been understood to require express congressional exercise.
What specifically renders these other two powers so similar to
preemption is that in all three cases Congress is empowered to alter the
default constitutional position of federal-state relations: concurrent state
authority regulated only by the Supremacy Clause (preemption); state
immunity from federal jurisdiction (the Eleventh Amendment); and state
regulatory limits (the dormant Commerce Clause). If the default position
can only be altered expressly by Congress in the second two cases, the same
should also apply in the case of preemption - and for the same reasons.
In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,62 decided in 1985, the Court
held that "Congress must express its intention to abrogate [the State's
constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court under] the
Eleventh Amendment in unmistakable language in the statute itself."63 The
Court explained why it did not permit implied exercise of Congress's
abrogation power as follows:
[B]ecause the Eleventh Amendment implicates the fundamental
constitutional balance between the Federal Government and the
States, this Court consistently has held that these exceptions [to
state immunity] apply only when certain specific conditions are
met... ; [in the case of abrogation] 'an unequivocal expression of
164congressional intent ....
Elsewhere, the opinion for the Court explained that express exercise of the
abrogation power was required because "Congress' power to abrogate a
State's immunity means that in certain circumstances the usual
constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government does
not obtain. ' 65 Although since Atascadero the Court has changed its position
at least once (and possibly twice depending on point of view) on the issue of
62. 473 U.S. 234 (1985), superseded by statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-506, 100 Stat. 1845 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000)).
63. Id. at 243.
64. Id. at 238-40 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984))
(footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 242.
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whether Congress has the enumerated power to abrogate state immunity
under the Commerce Clause as well as under the Fourteenth Amendment's
enforcement power,66 its rule of express textual abrogation has been
continuously affirmed under both powers.67
The Court has also long held that Congress's power to authorize
otherwise unconstitutional state discrimination against interstate commerce
can only be exercised by "an unmistakably clear" and "unequivocal"
expression of approval by Congress and not by "implicit approval. 68 This
is so even though the source of this power is the Commerce Clause. Thus,
even if the Commerce Clause is taken to be the source of Congress's power
of preemption, the authorization power is powerful precedent for rejecting
implied exercises in circumstances analogous to preemption.
In South-Central Timber Development, Inc., v. Wunnicke, 69 decided in
1984, the Court held that Congress's power to remove a state regulation
from the reach of the dormant Commerce Clause is subject to "[a] rule
requiring a clear expression of approval by Congress ... .,7o It also
described the congressional requirement in the same terms as in Atascedero:
"congressional intent must be unmistakably clear."'" Moreover, in rejecting
the lower court's "implicit approval" theory, the Court stated as follows:
"[t]he requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise
invalid state legislation is mandated by the policies underlying dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. 72 It went on to explain that such "affirmative
contemplation" by Congress ensures that a decision to permit one state such
an advantage represents a "collective decision' 7 3 of the nation rather than
exploitative cost-exporting by a single state. Although, unlike in the
Eleventh Amendment context, the Court suggested that the required "clear
expression of approval" might appear in the legislative history and not
necessarily in the statute itself,74 the constitutional duty placed on Congress
66. Controversy over this power was first triggered by Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989) (holding for the first time that Congress has power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity) and heightened by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (overruling Union Gas on this point).
67. This is not to say, of course, that the rule has not been challenged. In Atascadero itself,
Justice Brennan seemingly dissented on this point-arguing instead for ordinary principles of
statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent. Ataseadero, 473 U.S. at 248-52. In Union
Gas and Seminole Tribe, the issue dividing the Court was the congressional power and not the
existence or appropriateness of express abrogation. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 1; Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 44-45. In several other cases finding no express abrogation, the minority argued that the
Atascadero standard had in fact been met, although certain justices also supported Justice Brennan's
position that this standard should be lowered. Atascadero, 473 U.S. 303-04.
68. South-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (1984).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 92.
71. Id. at 91.
72. Id. at 91-92.
73. Id. at 92.
74. South-Cent. Timber, 467 U.S. at 92. The Court explains that
to exercise its judgment on the merits of upholding state authority clearly
rules out a purely implied authorization.
By contrast with this requirement of "unmistakably clear" and
"unequivocal" expression of congressional intent in the Eleventh
Amendment and dormant Commerce Clause contexts, the Court officially
requires the lesser test of "clear and manifest intent" before Congress will be
deemed to have exercised its preemption power. 5 Although arguably even
this lesser test should rule out any form of implied preemption, in practice
the Court has of course long held that "clear and manifest" congressional
intent may be implied under its field preemption and conflict preemption
rubrics.7 6  That is, congressional silence on the issue does not prevent
judicial implication of preemption (a) where the scope of regulation is
sufficiently comprehensive to make such inference reasonable (field
preemption) or (b) where there is an actual conflict between federal and state
regulation (conflict preemption).77
My thesis here is that there is simply no justification for this lesser
requirement in the case of preemption. "[W]hen Congress has been silent
with respect to preemption," there should be no judicial "resort" to
preemption principles of any sort. " The states should not be preempted as a
result of merely "reasonable" judicial inference from congressional
silence.79 Proper understanding of the nature of preemption as a power to
abrogate concurrent state authority renders it sufficiently similar to
Eleventh Amendment abrogation to require a similar standard, and the stated
rationale behind the condition on both Eleventh Amendment and dormant
Commerce Clause powers is exactly the same in the preemption context:
namely, congressional altering of the Constitution's default position on
It is true that most of our cases have looked for an express statement of congressional
approval prior to finding that state regulation is permissible... [but] [t]here is no
talismanic significance to the phrase 'expressly stated,' however; it merely states one way
of meeting the requirement that for state regulation to be removed from the reach of the
dormant Commerce Clause, congressional intent must be unmistakably clear. The
requirement that Congress affirmatively contemplate otherwise invalid state legislation is
mandated by the policies underlying dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947), the locus classicus
of modem preemption doctrine: "Congress legislated here in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied. So we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act [United States Warehouse Act] unless that was the
clear and manifest purpose of Congress."
76. The passage from Rice quoted in supra note 75 continues as follows: "Such a [clear and
manifest] purpose may be evidenced in various ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the states to supplement
it .... Or the state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective of the federal
statute." Rice, 331 U.S. at 231 (citations omitted).
77. See id. at 532 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("We resort to
principles of implied preemption-that is, inquiring whether Congress has occupied a particular field
with the intent to supplant state law or whether state law actually conflicts with federal law-only
when Congress has been silent with respect to pre-emption.") (citation omitted).
78. Id. (quoting from Justice Blackmun's statement of preemption principles).
79. Quoting from the Court's statement of implied preemption principles in Rice, 331 U.S. at
231; see supra note 76.
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federal-state relations. 80 Indeed, it is the failure to see that preemption is
simply an enumerated power like these two others, having no more
connection to the automatic operation of the Supremacy Clause than they (or
any other enumerated powers) do, that is primarily responsible for its
different treatment. Accordingly, one of the benefits of distinguishing
preemption from supremacy is to remove this false barrier to similar
treatment for similar powers.
Third, the limits I have proposed may be seen as a representation-
reinforcement mechanism for the states that renders the "political safeguards
of federalism" a more attractive and workable theory than at present. 8' By
insisting that before being preempted the states are owed more in the
political process than reasonable judicial inference from congressional
silence, those who currently deem purely procedural safeguards for
federalism inadequate may be persuaded otherwise. As is well known, both
the Court and the commentators have been locked in a war of attrition over
the constitutional sufficiency of the political process as exclusive protector
of the states ever since Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority82 made this the law in the specific area of federal application of
general regulations to the states in 1985.
As a general approach to federalism, there has been little focus within
this debate on the content of the political process, as it were, by contrast with
its representative structure and results. 83  The requirement of express
preemption suggests a way of breaking the deadlock by bolstering the
process that the states are due in Congress. By imposing a constitutional
duty on Congress to address the issue of preemption in the statutory text, my
proposal enhances political protection of the states, but without placing
substantive limits on congressional power. In short, if Congress can only
preempt the states expressly, then legislative proposals preempting the states
are less likely to pass. This type of new procedural protection, which may
80. See discussion supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
81. Tracing its roots to Madison's argument in The Federalist No. 46 that because the federal
political institutions are elected by or accountable to state constituencies, they will be sensitive to
state interests, this theory stands for the proposition that judicial enforcement of federalism is less
necessary than judicial enforcement of other constitutional norms, especially individual rights
provisions. THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison). For its modem locus classicus, see Herbert
Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and
Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954). For an influential recent
updating of the theory, see Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards
of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000).
82. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985), superseded by statute, Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-150, 99 Stat. 787.
83. For example, as the Court noted in Garcia:
[T]he principal means chosen by the Framers to insure the role of the States in the federal
system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself.... State sovereign interests,
then, are more properly protected by the procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of
the federal system than by judicially created limitations on federal power.
Id. at 550, 552.
perhaps be termed "constitutional hard look doctrine," is potentially of quite
general significance as an alternative to the existing polar claims of judicial
versus political safeguards of federalism.
84
Finally, comparative constitutional materials also provide precedent and
support for the limit I have proposed for Congress's power of preemption.
This is because at least two of the world's most important federal systems
have imposed approximately similar conditions on the power. To explain
these limits and how they might be relevant in the U.S. constitutional
context, a little translation is in order.
In Germany, Article 72(2) of the Basic Law contains a general
constitutional limit on the federal exercise of all concurrent powers that is
broadly similar to how I have argued the Necessary and Proper Clause
should be understood to limit the preemption power. This general limit is
necessary in Germany because, it will be recalled, the effect of a federal
exercise of concurrent power is the automatic preemption of all state law in
the same area. 85 In particular, Article 72(2) states that:
The [federal government] shall have the right to legislate in these
matters [within concurrent federal and state power] to the extent
that a need for regulation by federal legislation exists because:
(1) a matter cannot be effectively regulated by the legislation of
individual [states,] or...
(3) the maintenance of legal or economic unity... necessitates
such regulation.86
Article 72(2) was also the inspiration and source for the principle of
"subsidiarity," which was adopted by the European Union in 1992.
According to Article 5 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community,
subsidiarity places similar limits on the exercise of the EU's concurrent
legislative powers.87 Although neither the German Constitutional Court nor
the European Court of Justice has shown much interest in reviewing federal
legislation for substantive violations of these textual limits, the latter at least
84. I have elsewhere suggested this type of enhanced procedural protection in the context of
Congress's power to regulate intrastate commerce as well as preemption. See Gardbaum, supra note
2, at 819-31. See also Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REv. 2180, 2231-45 (1998).
85. See discussion supra Part IV and note 53.
86. Grundgesetz flir die Bundesrepublik Deutschland [GG] [German Basic Law] May 23, 1949,
art. 72, cl. 2(l)-(3).
87. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 5 (ex art. 3b), which states that:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this
Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states
and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better
achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the
objectives of this Treaty.
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has suggested the limits are to be enforced procedurally.88 That is, the EU's
legislative organs are affirmatively required to consider, and "exercise
judgment," on the necessity of federal legislative intervention.
Rather than a general limit on the exercise of all concurrent federal
powers, my proposal, translated into the specific context of the power of
preemption in the United States, is that if Congress wishes to exercise its
preemption power, then the same basic criteria found in Germany and the
EU should apply as a result of the Necessary and Proper Clause. Congress
may only preempt the states where it has exercised its judgment on the
necessity of so doing and the statutory text testifies to this.
In sum, both the Necessary and Proper Clause derivation of the power
and its similarity to other federal-state altering congressional powers suggest
that Congress must exercise its preemption power expressly. Preemption
should not be premised on "sheer implication" 89 from congressional silence.
Such a condition on the preemption power is further supported both by
comparative federal experience and by a friendly amendment to the theory
of the political safeguards of federalism. I should stress that the proposed
limit is constitutional in nature and is not "merely" a rule of statutory
interpretation (whatever the latter means in this context): Congress has no
power to impliedly preempt the states.90
VII. THE RESULTING PREEMPTION DOCTRINE
The result of my analysis is a radical simplification of preemption law.
Congress has the power to preempt the states but can only do so expressly:
88. Although the European Court of Justice has generally manifested a reluctance to address the
issue of the justiciability of subsidiarity, in three cases it has engaged in procedural review, requiring
that the legislative organs explain in the legislative text why they considered exercise of concurrent
federal power necessary (while requiring no explicit reference to subsidiarity). See Case C-233/94,
F.R.G. v. Eur. Parl. and Council of the EU, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2405 (holding that statements in the
legislation's preamble adequately explained why the Parliament and Council considered their action
complied with subsidiarity, even though there was no explicit reference to that principle); Case C-
377/98, Neth. v. Eur. Parl. & Council of the E.U., 2001 E.C.R. 1-07079 (same); Case C-491/01, The
Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health, 2002 E.C.R. 1-11453 (same).
89. Seesupra note 56.
90. To the extent that my proposal can be thought of as instituting a constitutional "plain
statement rule," it would be a general rule for the power of preemption as a whole-as with
Congress's abrogation and approval powers. As a matter of existing doctrine, the Court has imposed
a "plain statement rule" only in the specific context of whether congressional statutes apply to state
judges. In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the only case employing the "plain statement
rule," the issue was whether the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) should be
interpreted to cover state judges. If so, then this would clearly trump the conflicting state law
permitting age-related compulsory retirement of judges. The Court applied the plain statement rule
to interpret the ADEA as not applying to state judges. Id. at 467. In my terms, the Court applied
this rule to the issue of supremacy and not preemption (i.e., whether there was a conflict between
state and federal law). More generally, my proposal is that Congress must speak to the issue of
preemption in the statutory text. What it says may sometimes, however, not be "clear" or "plain," in
which case courts have the duty of interpreting the ambiguity.
there is no such thing as implied preemption. In this context, congressional
silence does not speak louder than words. If Congress wishes to exercise its
preemption power, it must say so in the statutory text. Where Congress has
not spoken directly to the issue of preemption, there is no second set of
principles-implied preemption-permitting courts to infer preemption from
the nuances of congressional silence, as at present. 9' Accordingly, absent
express preemption, state law can be displaced only by the ordinary
operation of the supremacy principle: a particular federal law trumps a
particular state law when their contents conflict. Such trumping under the
Supremacy Clause operates automatically and without reference to
congressional power or intent.
Let me run through the existing categories of preemption doctrine to
underscore how they would fare under my framework. First, express
preemption survives as the only type of preemption. As a condition of a
valid exercise of its power, Congress is required to address the issue of
preemption by express statement in the text of the statute. While this does
not mandate an explicitly labeled "preemption provision" per se,92 or any
other particular form of words, it does require statutory language speaking
directly to the issue of the effect of Congress's regulation on non-conflicting
state laws and/or concurrent state authority. If there is no such statement,
there is no such effect. This constitutional rule states a condition on the
exercise of the power similar to those applying to Congress's abrogation of
state immunity and approval powers.93 By contrast, once the condition is
satisfied, the precise scope and extent of Congress's exercise of the power
will be a matter of the ordinary statutory interpretation of the express
provision or provisions-as with the exercise of any other enumerated
power. 94 That is, what Congress says directly about the issue may be
91. An oft-quoted Supreme Court statement of the current standard is the following: "Preemption
may be either express or implied, and 'is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated
in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose."' Gade v. Nat'l Solid
Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)).
It is, of course, this second alternative that I am challenging.
92. On this point I agree with Justice Kennedy in his Gade concurrence, and disagree with
Justice Souter's dissent. Compare Gade, 505 U.S. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Though most
statutes creating express pre-emption contain an explicit statement to that effect.., we have never
required any particular magic words in our express preemption cases."), with id. at 115 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("express pre-emption requires 'explicit pre-emptive language."'). For examples of this
difference in practice, see discussion infra Part VIII.
93. See discussion supra Part VI.
94. Here, I agree with Justice Scalia that in interpreting the statutory text to determine what
Congress has said about preemption, there should be no role for a presumption of preemption. See
Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 545 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). Whether or not these ordinary rules of statutory interpretation include
the use of legislative history will presumably depend on one's general theory of statutory
interpretation. In keeping with his general theory, Justice Scalia has suggested that he rules out the
use of legislative history in express preemption cases. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 389-91 (2000). Whether he also rules it out in implied preemption cases is
less clear.
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ambiguous, particularly given that exercise of the preemption power is not
only a yes-no issue but also an issue of to what extent.
95
Second, field preemption-as the first type of implied preemption under
existing doctrine-would simply be abolished. Defined as the reasonable
inference by the courts, absent an express preemption statement, of
congressional intent to preempt all concurrent state authority within a given
field from the scope of congressional regulation96 field preemption simply
fails the threshold condition on the exercise of Congress's power-just as
such inferences would currently fail the conditions on Congress's abrogation
and authorization powers. "Sheer implication" from congressional silence is
inadequate. This does not, of course, mean that Congress cannot preempt an
entire regulatory field; it means only that Congress must do so expressly. 97
Third, conflict preemption, the oxymoron that currently functions as the
second type of implied preemption, would similarly be abolished. The mere
existence of a conflict between state and federal law does not constitute
express exercise of congressional power to displace non-conflicting law
and/or concurrent state authority; i.e., its power to preempt. Indeed, as I
have argued previously,98 even under the existing preemption framework
with its lesser test and resulting acceptance of purely implied preemption,
conflict preemption makes little sense as a matter of statutory interpretation.
If the nature of preemption is properly understood, it is highly unlikely that
by itself a substantive conflict between federal and state laws would ever
constitute evidence from which congressional intent to preempt can even
reasonably be inferred. If the federal law predates that of the states, there is
no conflict from which to infer a congressional intent to preempt at the time
95. Although they are thus "similar," the limits I am proposing on Congress's preemption power
are not quite the same as the current limits on either Congress's abrogation (unambiguous statement
of abrogation in the statutory text) or approval power (unambiguous expression of congressional
intent, but not necessarily in the statutory text). See discussion supra Part VI. It is beyond the scope
of this article to discuss whether or not the standard I am proposing for preemption should also apply
to both of these other powers. However, some divergence in standards may be justified by an
important difference between the powers. Whereas both the abrogation and approval powers are
essentially "yes or no" issues and not questions of degree, preemption is also a question of degree: to
what extent is Congress exercising its power, and what types of non-conflicting state laws and/or
concurrent state authority is it displacing. In these circumstances, there is arguably greater room for
congressional ambiguity and need for statutory interpretation, and the constitutional test may
plausibly reflect this.
96. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1947).
97. As I have argued elsewhere, even within the existing framework of preemption doctrine and
independently of my constitutional argument against it, field preemption survives as an awkward
holdover from the initial establishment of preemption in the early twentieth century. See Gardbaum,
supra note 1, at 811-12. It will be recalled that at this point, preemption was deemed not a
discretionary congressional power, but an automatic consequence of congressional entry into a field.
Id. Under this mechanism of preemption, congressional intent was as irrelevant as it is under the
automatic principle of supremacy. Once the Court shifted to the modem understanding of
preemption as a discretionary power, however, the very notion of field preemption always existed
uneasily alongside the stated modem focus on congressional intent. Id. It should now be rejected.
98. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 808-10.
it was enacted. If the federal law that neither occupies the field nor contains
an express preemption provision is enacted after the conflicting state law,
surely the only reasonable inference about congressional intent (even if it
were relevant) is to displace the particular state law, and not to preempt.
What remains after the abolition of conflict preemption is simply supremacy
as an alternative mechanism for displacing state law, as in the medical
marijuana case.
Fourth, as a sub-species of conflict preemption, obstacle preemption will
of course suffer the same fate. Concurrent state law and/or authority is not
preempted merely because it stands as an obstacle to the full implementation
of congressional policy, although of course this may be the reason that
Congress chooses to exercise its preemption power. There is a genuine issue
concerning obstacle preemption that survives my analysis, however, but it
concerns supremacy and not preemption: what degree of conflict between
state and federal laws is necessary to trigger the automatic supremacy
principle? Although this issue is largely tangential to the thesis of this
Article, once disconnected from preemption and inferences about
congressional intent, it seems reasonably clear from first principles that
supremacy requires irreconcilability between state and federal laws and not
mere interference or inconvenience. 99 Short of either adopting automatic
preemption, as in the U.S. between 1912 and 1933100 and currently in
Germany,010 or an exercise by Congress of its preemption power, the
existence of concurrent powers necessarily presumes a certain amount of
unavoidable inconvenience and friction when they are both exercised.
Supremacy is designed to do away with the most extreme form of such
friction-namely, irreconcilability-but not all forms.
Fifth, as a distinct variety of obstacle preemption, Justice Souter-
drawing on the work of Professor Laurence Tribe-has identified what he
refers to as "purpose-conflict pre-emption," 102 although this term has not yet
been given official imprimatur. In several recent cases, the Court has found
implied preemption because state law is held to obstruct or frustrate not the
substance of federal policy, but the underlying congressional intent to
preempt. For example, in Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management
Ass 'n,10 3 a plurality held that state safety laws for hazardous waste workers
conflicted with the full purposes and objectives of Congress's Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSHA), which were to have a single set of
99. Historical support for this position is impressively marshaled by Professor Nelson, see
Nelson, supra note 12, at 251. He refers to the requirement as the "logical-contradiction test" as
distinguished from the "physical impossibility" test. See id. at 260.
100. See Gardbaum, supra note 1, at 801-08.
101. See discussion supra Part VI.
102. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 115-16 (1992) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("As one commentator has observed, this kind of purpose-conflict pre-emption, which occurs when
state law is held to 'undermin[e] a congressional decision in favor of national uniformity of
standards,' presents a 'situation similar in practical effect to that of federal occupation of a field."')
(quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486 (2d ed. 1988)).
103. Gade, 505 U.S. at 88.
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regulations on the subject.'04 As Justice Blackmun also correctly noted, this
type of obstacle preemption is really just the flip side of a finding of field
preemption.° 5 If congressional intent to preempt a given field is inferred
(and, of course, is deemed a valid exercise of the preemption power), then
the commonplace operation of the Supremacy Clause 0 6 means that every
particular state law within that field will conflict with the exercise of
preemption and be displaced. Within the existing framework, this is just two
ways of saying the same thing, although it is the finding of field preemption
that is doing all the work. Under my framework, both sides of this coin will
disappear. If Congress intends to preempt an entire field of regulation, it
must do so expressly. If it does, then of course the technical operation of the
Supremacy Clause will also mean that any state law in that field is in
conflict with this exercise of power. If it does not preempt expressly, then
regardless of its "intent," there is no exercise of the preemption power for
the Supremacy Clause to operate on.
Finally, what about the general presumption against preemption with
which the Court routinely begins its ritualistic statement of preemption
principles, and which has come in for some recent academic criticism?0 7
Under the framework developed in this Article, a presumption against
preemption is reflected in the threshold constitutional issue of ruling out
implied exercises of the preemption power, but not in interpreting the
necessary express statement. That is, a proper understanding of preemption
as distinct from, and a more radical inroad on state power than, the principle
of supremacy alone supports a "presumption" against preemption that takes
the form of the conditions on the congressional power that I have suggested.
Given the constitutional limits attaching to the preemption power, there
should be no additional presumption against preemption as a matter of
statutory interpretation. In interpreting the extent and scope of Congress's
express preemption provisions, ordinary, unmediated principles of statutory
interpretation should be used without any presumption one way or the
other. 108 As far as supremacy is concerned, ordinary principles of statutory
interpretation should also apply to the federal text in comparing it to the
state with no starting presumptions.'0 9 As discussed above, however, the
104. Id. at 98. For details and discussion, as well as other recent cases falling under this rubric,
see the discussion infra Part VIII.
105. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80, n.5 (1990) (majority opinion of
Blackmun, J.) ("[Flield preemption may be understood as a species of conflict preemption: A state
law that falls within a pre-empted field conflicts with Congress' intent (either express or plainly
implied) to exclude state regulation.").
106. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
107. See Nelson, supra note 12; Dinh, supra note 23.
108. Here, as already noted, I agree with Justice Scalia, see supra note 94, and also with Professor
Nelson, see supra note 12, and Professor Dinh, see supra note 23.
109. For an instructive historical/textual argument based on the original understanding of the non
obstante clause in the Supremacy Clause, see Nelson, supra note 12.
general concept of a "conflict of laws" suggests that irreconcilability or
contradiction and not mere interference is necessary before a state law is
displaced.
VIII. APPLICATION TO THE LEADING PREEMPTION CASES OF RECENT YEARS
In this final section, I will illustrate the practical workings of my recast
preemption doctrine by applying it to the leading cases of recent years.
In English v. General Electric Co.," decided in 1990, the Court
unanimously held that state tort law of intentional infliction of emotional
distress was not within the field impliedly preempted by federal nuclear
safety regulation, as previously defined in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v.
State Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission."' In
addition, it found no "actual conflict""' 2 between congressional intent and
state law, because of the previous finding that there was no such intent." 3
Although reaching the same result, my framework would simply find that
there is no express preemption here and, under supremacy principles, no
substantive conflict between the texts of the federal laws and the state laws.
Contrary to the Court's fairly typical treatment of the actual conflict issue,
the only question under ordinary supremacy principles should be the
reconcilability of the two sets of rules; congressional intent is irrelevant.
In the 1992 case of Gade v. National Solid Waste, 1 4 a plurality of four
held that Illinois' occupational health and safety laws dealing with
hazardous waste were impliedly preempted by Congress's OSHA under the
doctrine of obstacle preemption." 5  The state rules were found to be in
conflict with the full purposes and objectives of the federal statute, which
were to have a single set of regulations (federal or state) on the subject." 6
Justice Kennedy's concurrence found express preemption from the relevant
text of OSHA, and criticized the plurality for an "undue expansion of our
implied pre-emption jurisprudence which, in my view, is neither wise nor
necessary.""' 7  The dissent rejected both arguments: first, express
preemption requires explicit preemptive language, which Justice Kennedy
acknowledged was lacking; second, contrary to the plurality, OSHA did not
disclose the clear expression of congressional intent required by the
110. 496 U.S. 72(1990).
111. 461 U.S. 190(1983).
112. English, 496 U.S. at 89.
113. This is a second example of the "two sides of the same coin" connection between field
preemption and "purpose-conflict" preemption discussed previously. See supra note 105.
114. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992).
115. Id. at 97.
116. Id. at 98. As discussed earlier, the plurality might just as easily have said that this
congressional intent amounted to implied preemption of the field. See supra note 105. Once again,
under the Court's current doctrine, the two are effectively mirror images of each other and
interchangeable. Of course, under my proposal, both field preemption and "purpose-conflict
preemption" would disappear.
117. Gade, 505 U.S. at 109 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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presumption against preemption, as it could with equal plausibility be read
consistently with non-preemption. 118
My framework first asks whether, as a threshold condition of the
exercise of its power, Congress has expressly addressed the issue of
preemption in the text of the statute-even though there may be no explicit
preemption provision per se. On this point, I agree with Justice Kennedy
and disagree with both the plurality and dissent. It seems clear from the text
of OSHA that Congress addressed the issue of preemption and so has
satisfied the threshold constitutional test.1t 9 The next question is how has
Congress addressed the issue in the text, and this should be answered using
ordinary principles of statutory interpretation without any presumption one
way or the other. To my mind this is a close case on the facts. Although
what Congress has expressly said is not entirely free from ambiguity as to
preemption of supplementary state regulation, overall the preemptive
interpretation of OSHA's Section 18(b) is more plausible than the non-
preemptive. 120
If, by contrast, one interprets what Congress has expressly said in
section 18 as not preempting the states, then the only possible way that state
law can be displaced is by supremacy principles. Do the relevant state and
federal laws conflict? On the facts, the answer appears to be no, because
OSHA mandates a minimum requirement of three days of actual field
experience for certification of all registered hazardous waste workers,
whereas the state law sets a minimum of 500 days for the licensing of some
(such as crane operators). 121 These are clearly not irreconcilable, as they
would be if the federal standard had required no more than three days. The
plurality once again (misguidedly to my mind) looks to congressional intent
in analyzing the case as one of obstacle preemption, finding a desire for
uniformity with which concurrent state authority would interfere. 122  But
under ordinary supremacy principles, congressional intent is irrelevant; the
118. Seeid. atl14-22.
119. Id. at 112 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The relevant text of OSHA is section 18 as a whole.
See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (2000). By contrast, the plurality stated that "[w]e cannot agree that the
negative implications of the text, although ultimately dispositive to our own [obstacle preemption]
analysis, expressly address the issue of federal pre-emption of state law." Gade, 505 U.S. at 104,
n.2. The dissent, as mentioned above, stated that "[e]xpress preemption requires 'explicit
preemptive language,"' presumably meaning an explicitly labeled preemption provision. See id. at
115. In my view, both the plurality and the dissent create too high of a threshold for express
preemption, which should simply require that Congress address the issue of preemption in the text,
i.e., speak directly to the issue of the impact of its regulatory scheme on non-conflicting state law
and/or concurrent state authority. The important contrast is with purely implied preemption, i.e.,
inferring preemption not from what Congress has said in the text but from its silence.
120. Section 18(b) reads as follows: "Any State which... desires to assume responsibility for
development and enforcement therein of occupational safety and health standards relating to any
occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a Federal standard has been promulgated
shall submit a State plan .... 29 U.S.C. §667(b) (2000).
121. Id. at 94.
122. Id. at 103.
only relevant conflict is between the content of the text it has enacted and
that of the existing state rules.123 If Congress intends uniformity, its intent
counts only if expressed in the statute; such intent should not be implied and
then used to create a conflict with state law.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,12 4 a plurality of the Court
interpreted the express preemption provision of the 1969 Public Health
Cigarette Smoking Act to preempt one of the plaintiffs state common law
claims but not the others.1 25  By contrast, Justice Blackmun's partial
concurrence and dissent interpreted the express provision not to preempt any
state common law claims, 26 while Justice Scalia's interpreted it to preempt
all the state common law claims. 27 In the course of his opinion, Justice
Scalia identified and rejected two principles relied on by those finding at
least some state common law claims to have survived. 128 These were: first,
given the existence of an express preemption provision, the scope of
preemption was governed entirely by its language, thus ruling out any type
of implied preemption; 129 and second, the presumption against preemption
applies to express preemption provisions. 130
My framework suggests disagreement with Justice Scalia on this first
point but agreement on the second. The scope of preemption should always
be governed entirely by the language of express preemption provisions (and
any other text speaking directly to the issue) because express preemption is
the only type there should be. But in interpreting such provisions, ordinary
principles of statutory interpretation should be used to determine whether
and to what extent Congress has exercised its power. Once Congress has
spoken directly to the preemption issue by enacting an explicit preemption
provision, the scope and extent of its exercise should be left to ordinary
statutory interpretation of what it has said. Whether or not this includes
legislative history will depend upon a general account of the proper method
of statutory interpretation. For Justice Scalia, I presume the answer is no. 31
Again, the presumption against preemption is reflected only in the
requirement of express exercise of the power, not in interpreting its scope.
Like Cipollone, Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr'32 involved interpreting the scope of
an express preemption provision.
123. See discussion supra Part II.
124. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
125. The Court held that the 1969 Act preempted the plaintiffs failure to warn claim but not
express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy claims. Id. at 524-31.
126. Id. at 531.
127. Id. at 544.
128. Id. at 545-48.
129. Id. at 545.
130. Id. at 549.
131. As is well-known, Justice Scalia is an outspoken critic of using legislative history in statutory
interpretation. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997). As noted above,
whether he believes this also applies to implied preemption is unclear. See supra note 94 and
accompanying text.
132. Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
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Although curious in its failure to analyze the case through the standard
preemption metric, American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office
Telephone, Inc. '33 found preemption of state contract and tort claims based
on pure implication of congressional intent. Nothing in the text of the
relevant federal statute, the Communications Act of 1934, addressed the
preemption issue. This is, therefore, a clear example of preemption that
would not occur under my model.
A similar case is United States v. Locke, 134 in which the Court held that
the State of Washington's more stringent regulations of oil tankers in the
wake of the Torrey Canyon and Exxon Valdez disasters were impliedly
preempted by Title II of Congress's Port and Waterways Safety Act of 1972,
as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990... In affirming the 1978
decision in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,136 which interpreted the
unexpressed congressional intent behind Title II as mandating uniform
national rules, the Court in Locke held that the comprehensive federal
regulatory scheme governing oil tankers left no room for state regulation.' 37
In my terms, the only way that Congress can preempt a field is expressly.
Had the statutory text of Title II actually contained a provision mandating
uniform national rules on the list of specified subjects, this would amount to
perhaps the most minimal form of express preemption satisfying the
threshold test. Sheer implication of such a mandate from the "structure" and
"purpose" of the statute does not. 138
In Geier v. Honda,13 9 decided in 2000, the Court interpreted the express
preemption provision of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act
of 1966 not to preempt the plaintiffs state common law tort claim.
However, the Court held that the claim was impliedly preempted because it
actually conflicted with the relevant federal standard, FMVSS 208,
promulgated under the Act.140 A state common law duty to install airbags,
as urged by the plaintiff, stood as an obstacle to the full purposes and
objectives of the standard, which sought a gradual introduction of airbags
and a plurality of safety options. 141
For what it is worth, I agree with the interpretation of the express
preemption clause. Under my analysis, what then remains, of course, is an
ordinary application not of preemption but supremacy principles. A mere
obstacle to federal objectives, as found by the Court, is not sufficient to
133. 524 U.S. 214 (1998).
134. U.S. v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000).
135. Id. at 110.
136. 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
137. Locke, 529 U.S. at 110.
138. Id.
139. Geier v. Honda, 529 U.S. 861, 868 (2000).
140. Id.
141. Id.
displace state law under the Supremacy Clause; rather a textual
irreconcilability is necessary. Arguably, there was such in this case, if the
text of FMVSS 208 is interpreted as permitting what the state common law
prohibited (i.e., the continued use of seatbelts without an airbag).
Finally, the 2000 case of Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council142
is a third example of purely implied preemption that would be ruled out
under my proposal. The Court once again relied on obstacle preemption to
hold that Massachusetts's Burma Law was preempted because it frustrated
federal statutory objectives, even though Congress had not addressed the
issue in that statute. 143 And once again, absent express preemption, this is a
case of ordinary supremacy principles. Only a genuine conflict between the
contents of state law and federal law - and not a conflict with presumed
federal intentions - results in the trumping of the former in a case where
both are relied upon. Alternatively, the case could have been decided on the
basis that Congress has exclusive power in the area of foreign affairs. Either
way, this was not a case about preemption.
Accordingly, in some of these cases application of my framework to the
preemption issue results in different outcomes. In others, it reaches the same
outcome but does so via a different and, I believe, more principled, coherent,
and predictable preemption analysis. As I hope this application suggests,
my framework is informed not by any general, result-oriented bias either for
or against preemption, but by a proper understanding of the nature of this
constitutional concept and of Congress's power to preempt the states.
142. Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
143. That federal statute was the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570(d), 110 Stat. 3009-166 to 3009-167 (1997).
